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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay studies the effect of different kinds
of pension plans on the labor market decisions of the older workers. Due to the aging
population, Social Security’s projected annual cost is expected to increase to about 6.2 per-
cent of the Gross Domestic Product by 2035, thus posing significant challenges to the U.S.
policy makers. This has fueled an interest in research geared towards understanding the
determinants of retirement. Past research has shown that pensions have a significant effect
on retirement decisions. But the pension landscape in the U.S. has changed dramatically in
the last few decades. From being once dominated by the traditional annuity-based Defined
Benefit (DB) plans, the trend has now moved towards account-based Defined Contribution
(DC) plans. This change has been accompanied by a reversal in the participation trend
of older workers resulting in an increasing labor force participation of the elderly in the
United States over the last thirty years. This essay investigates the link between the two
by building a life cycle model of retirement and pension plan types. By conducting coun-
terfactual experiment which changes all DB plans to DC plans, I hope to understand the
role played by the differences in the nature of pension wealth accumulation under different
pension plans in explaining the differences in retirement behavior observed across different
pension plan holders.
The second essay explores policy questions pertinent to the aging population in the health-
care field. Medicare Part D is a government program introduced in 2006 to offer outpatient
drug benefits to Medicare beneficiaries. A lot of the brand-name drugs covered under Medi-
care Part D are also available in generic versions and it has been argued by policy makers
that a higher level of utilization of these generic drugs would result in significant cost sav-
ings for the government. However, the cost savings of forcing consumers onto generics
may lead to large welfare losses for consumers of non-generic alternatives if they highly
value them. This issue is addressed in this essay where a structural model of drug demand
that allows for heterogeneity in match quality between consumers and drugs and also al-
lows for consumer learning about the stochastic match quality of the drug is estimated.
The 2007-2008 administrative claims data for the 5%Medicare Sample is used for demand
estimation. By conducting counterfactual experiment which eliminates branded drugs for
which the generic is available from the choice-sets of consumers, I hope to understand the
effect of generic substitution on consumer welfare and the resulting cost savings for the
government.
iii
Contents
List of Figures vi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Effect of Pension Plan Type on Retirement Behavior 3
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Empirical Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Plans . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 Retirement Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3 Recent Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Health and Mortality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.3 Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.4 Budget-Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.5 Job-Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.6 Pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.7 Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.8 State-Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
iv
2.3.9 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.10 Recursive Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.1 Initial Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.2 Method of Simulated Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.3 Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.1 Preference Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.2 Model-fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.3 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 3 Consumer Learning, Product Differentiation, and The Value of
Generic Pharmaceutical Entry 29
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.2 Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.3 Learning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5 Baseline Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6 Counterfactual Policy Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
v
Bibliography 38
Appendix A Supplemental Material to Effect of Pension Plan Type on Retire-
ment Behavior 43
A.1 Mathematical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.1.1 Numerical Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.1.2 Quadrature Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.2 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix B SupplementalMaterial to The Costs and Benefits of IncreasedGeneric
Substitution 48
B.1 MCMC Sampler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vi
List of Figures
2.1 Changing Participation and Pension Plan Composition . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Participation of Men Ages 62 to 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Participation of Men By Pension Plan Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Labor Market Transitions for Men by Pension Plan Type . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Model vs. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Present Value of Accrued Benefits and Marginal Change in Benefits for
Hypothetical Worker with a Defined Benefit or a Defined Contribution Plan 9
2.2 Nature of Full Time to Part-Time Switch by Pension type (55-65 years) . . 11
2.3 Predicted Probability of having a DB, DC or NO Pension Plan from Multi-
nomial Logit Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Preference Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6 Pension Plan Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7 Labor force participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.1 Preference Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.2 Other Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
It is a well known fact now that the United States is experiencing an aging population.
According to the U.S Census Bureau estimates, the country will experience considerable
growth in it’s population between 2012 and 2050. The population aged 65 and over is
expected to almost double (increase from 43.1 million in 2012 to 83.7 million in 2050)
during this time period. The aging population will pose serious challenges to policy makers
and federal entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare which become
available at age 65. This dissertation explores policy scenarios for alleviating the fiscal
burden faced by these two federal programs by simulating quantitative models of retirement
and drug demand. It is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents the essay “Effect of Pension Plan Type on Retirement Behavior”.
This essay studies the effect of different kinds of pension plans on the labor market
decisions of the older workers. Due to the aging population, Social Security’s pro-
jected annual cost is expected to increase to about 6.2 percent of the Gross Domestic
Product by 2035, thus posing significant challenges to the U.S. policy makers. This
has fueled an interest in research geared towards understanding the determinants of
retirement. Past research has shown that pensions have a significant effect on retire-
ment decisions. But the pension landscape in the U.S. has changed dramatically in
the last few decades. From being once dominated by the traditional annuity-based
Defined Benefit (DB) plans, the trend has nowmoved towards account-based Defined
Contribution (DC) plans. This change has been accompanied by a reversal in the par-
ticipation trend of older workers resulting in an increasing labor force participation of
the elderly in the United States over the last thirty years. This essay investigates the
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link between the two by building a life cycle model of retirement and pension plan
types. By conducting counterfactual experiment which changes all DB plans to DC
plans, I hope to understand the role played by the differences in the nature of pension
wealth accumulation under different pension plans in explaining the differences in
retirement behavior observed across different pension plan holders.
• Chapter 3 presents the essay “Consumer Learning, Product Differentiation, and The
Value of Generic Pharmaceutical Entry” 1. The research outlined in this essay ex-
plores policy questions pertinent to the aging population in the healthcare field.
Medicare Part D is a government program introduced in 2006 to offer outpatient
drug benefits to Medicare beneficiaries. A lot of the brand-name drugs covered un-
der Medicare Part D are also available in generic versions and it has been argued
by policy makers that a higher level of utilization of these generic drugs would re-
sult in significant cost savings for the government. However, the cost savings of
forcing consumers onto generics may lead to large welfare losses for consumers of
non-generic alternatives if they highly value them. This issue is addressed in this es-
say where a structural model of drug demand that allows for heterogeneity in match
quality between consumers and drugs and also allows for consumer learning about
the stochastic match quality of the drug is estimated. By conducting counterfactual
experiment which eliminates branded drugs for which the generic is available from
the choice-sets of consumers, I am hoping to understand the effect of generic substi-
tution on consumer welfare and the resulting cost savings for the government..
1 The research outlined in this chapter was conducted in collaboration with Prof. Amil Petrin, Prof.
Pinar Karaca-Mandic and Prof. Jeffery McCullough. For this research, we use a 5% sample of Medicare
claims requested from the Center of Medicare and Medicaid services (CMS). We have the necessary Data
Use Agreement (DUA) for publishing the results of this research in our upcoming paper of the same title.
However, CMS requires a separate Data Use Agreement for publishing any results obtained using the data as
part of a dissertation. Due to these constraints, this essay only contains a brief overview of the project. The
author would like to direct the readers to the forthcoming paper “Consumer Learning, Product Differentiation,
and The Value of Generic Pharmaceutical Entry” for results and more details.
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Chapter 2
Effect of Pension Plan Type on
Retirement Behavior
2.1 Introduction
An understanding of the determinants of retirement behavior is important both from the
point of individual well-being as well as policy making. With nearly 76 million people in
the baby boom population (those born between 1946 and 1964) beginning to retire in the
U.S., Social Security’s projected annual cost is expected to increase to about 6.2 percent
of the Gross Domestic Product1 by 2035, thus posing significant challenges to the U.S.
policy makers [[De Nardi et al., 1999], [Galasso, 2008], [Bohn, 1999]]. This has fueled
an interest in research geared towards understanding the determinants of retirement. Past
research has shown that pension wealth is crucial in governing retirement decisions [[Stock
andWise, 1988], [Kotlikoff andWise, 1987], [Kotlikoff andWise, 1989], [Samwick, 1998],
[Chan and Stevens, 2004] ]. But the pension landscape in the U.S. has undergone a major
overhaul in the last few decades, changing the very nature of these retirement plans. From
being once dominated by the traditional annuity-based Defined Benefit (DB) plans, the
trend has nowmoved towards account-based Defined Contribution (DC) plans. This change
has been accompanied by a reversal in the participation trend of older workers resulting in
an increasing labor force participation of the elderly in the United States over the last thirty
years. The juxtaposition of these two trends suggest a potential link between the two. This
has made it important to re-visit the role of pensions on retirement. More specifically,
it sparks an interest in research trying to understand if the change in the pension plan
1Figure taken from 2013 Social Security Annual Report (Social Security and Medicare Boards of
Trustees).
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Figure 2.1: Changing Participation and Pension Plan Composition
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composition has been responsible for the recent increase in the labor market participation
of the older workers.
The long trend of declining participation of older workers reversed in the late 1980’s and
the participation of the age group 62 to 69 increased by over 15%. The pension plan com-
position also changed during the same time. This resulted in a more than 20% increase in
Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans and an even sharper decline in Defined Benefit
(DB) pension plans (Figure 2.1a and 2.1b). More importantly these changes have not been
confined to the United States alone. Broadbent et al. [2006] finds empirical evidence that
indicates a shift from the traditional Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution plans for sev-
eral other OECD countries like Canada, Australia and U.K. The striking observation is that
these countries also underwent a reversal in the trend of declining labor force participation
of the older workers around the same time as the change in pension landscape (Figure 2.2).
It has been well documented that Defined Benefit pension holders exit the labor market
two to three years earlier than people on Defined Contribution plans. I find three important
margins of variation in the retirement behavior across different pension plan holders (DB,
DC and those without any pension plans). These differences in retirement behavior are
potentially tied to the nature of pension wealth accumulation under these plans.
This essay provides a quantitative analysis of the effect of different pension plans on re-
tirement behavior. A life cycle model of retirement, savings and heterogeneity in pension
wealth accrual is estimated using data from the Health and Retirement Survey. The key
details of the two pension plans – DB and DC are built into a dynamic programming model
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Figure 2.2: Participation of Men
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of retirement which generates the differences in wealth accumulation patterns. This in turn
generates the differences in retirement behavior in the model as observed in the data. Hence
the model developed in this here produces rich variations in employment patterns across
different pension groups without resorting to any kind of unobserved heterogeneity in pref-
erences. Such a model has two important contributions. First, it can be used to understand
the role of the recent pension plan phase-out on the increase in labor force participation
of the elderly. Second, the variation in employment patterns across different pension plan
types can be exploited to get a better understanding of retirement behavior by obtaining
sharper estimates of some key preference parameters.
The existing structural models of retirement can be broadly classified into three groups
with respect to modeling pension wealth. The first is a class of models having pension
wealth accrual through a single kind of pension plan which combines features of both
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution [French, 2005], [French and Jones, 2011], [Blau
and Gilleskie, 2008]. The models in these papers cannot generate the different retirement
patterns across different pension plan types and hence, are not suited for understanding
the effect of changing pension plan composition on retirement behavior. For instance, the
pension benefits in [Blau and Gilleskie, 2008] depends on an individual’s age, experience
and employment status which closely resembles the Defined Benefit plan structure. This
benefit formula is not a good approximation for wealth under a Defined Contribution plan
for two reasons. First, DB benefits are distributed as an annuity whereas DC wealth is
distributed as a onetime lump some transfer to a non-pension account. Second, this formula
is unable capture the most important difference between the two plans – DB plans max out
after a certain age incentivizing exit from the labor market whereas the returns to staying
with the provider for an additional year stays the same for DC plan holders. This is key to
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explaining the difference in retirement behavior observed for people on these two different
pension plans. For this reason, the pension benefits in this work for DB and DC plans
are calculated using two different mechanisms. DB benefits are approximated on the same
lines as the above mentioned papers but DC wealth is modeled as a separate account based
wealth with fixed contributions from employer and employee every period.
The second group of papers abstract away frommodeling pension wealth accrual [Casanova,
2010], [Van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008], [Rust and Phelan, 1997]. The models in these
papers miss a key source of variation in retirement behavior. Finally [Blau, 2011] models
pension wealth accrual through both Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution plans for
understanding the effect of pension wealth in crowding out private savings. This paper
abstract away from some important ingredients pinning down retirement behavior.
The model developed in here mainly builds on [French, 2005] and [Blau, 2011]. It extends
the former by introducing three new features –1) pension wealth accumulation through DC
plans 2) allowing for people to have no pension wealth and 3) allowing for job switches
from pension providing to non-pension providing jobs along with an exogenous job de-
struction resulting in a choice between new job and non-participation. The first two exten-
sions allow the dynamic dynamic programming model to generate the difference in partic-
ipation and hours (as observed in data) across these pension groups. The third extension
has varying degrees of importance for the three pension groups in the model. It allows
the DB agents in the model to reduce hours (in the event of bad health) by switching to
non-pension employer. Hence, this mechanism helps them to mitigate the loss in pension
wealth in the event of reducing hours. In the absence of this mechanism the model gen-
erates sharper drop in participation for this group. For instance, just before age 62 (the
maturity of DB pension in the model), a bad health shock results in labor market exit for
DB pension holders. This is due to the fact that reduction in hours result in pension loss for
this group. This mechanism is relatively less important for DC pension group and does not
affect the behavior of the people with no pensions (no one in this group chooses to switch
employers endogenously). Agents with DC pension plans in the model choose to switch
employers mainly between ages 60 to 65 to get access to their DC account (before age 65,
DC account in the model is accessible only upon switching employers). This is observed
in the event of a bad health shock reducing hours worked and hence earnings (both through
hours worked and effect of health on wages) in that period.
This work builds on the latter work by introducing – 1) intensive margin and 2) health
shocks affecting the total amount leisure available in a given period. Introducing the choice
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of hours worked in a retirement model generates a new margin of adjustment for the agents.
Since hours worked before retirement are observed to be different for the three pension
groups, this can generate a new source of variation in the model which can be exploited to
get sharper estimates of participation cost parameter and labor supply elasticities. Health is
an important determinant of retirement [Dwyer andMitchell, 1999], [Sickles and Taubman,
1984]. The health shocks in the model are crucial for generating reduction in hours worked
and non-participation.
The primary goal of the model developed here is to understand the effect of the recent
shift from DB to DC pension plans in the increase in participation of the older workers.
The model uses two parameters for fitting the participation rates across the pension groups
(others fixed from French [2005]). The model can generate the systematic difference in
participation rates across the two pension groups at older ages . The counterfactual exper-
iment involves changing all DB plans to DC plans in the model (keeping all other initial
conditions like pension wealth the same). This results in a 17% increase in participation
for age group 57 to 69. So according to this model roughly 43% of the recent increase in
participation can be attributed to the change in the pension plan composition.
The dynamic programming model developed in this essay is estimated using Method of
Simulated Moments. One novel feature about the model is it’s ability to use the variation
in the retirement behavior across pension pension plans to get sharper estimates for the
participation cost. The estimate of participation cost is 35% lower than other estimates
obtained using a model with pension wealth accumulation through a single DB like plan.
2.2 Empirical Facts
Using the bi-annual panel data from the Health and Retirement Survey (1992-2010), I find
three important sources of variation in the retirement behavior of older workers across
the three pension groups - DB, DC and those with no pension plans. I first describe the
structure of the two pension plans in the U.S. to demonstrate how this could be responsible
for generating the differences in retirement behavior across different plan holders. I then
document the main sources of variation in retirement behavior across the three pension
groups as observed in the data. Finally, I lay out potential reasons for the change in pension
landscape in the U.S..
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2.2.1 Defined Benefit vs. Defined Contribution Plans
The two types of pension plans – Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution – have different
wealth accrual patterns over the life cycle of an individual. The benefits in a defined benefit
plan are based on tenure and earnings in the final years of service. As a result, pension
wealth in a DB plan accrues non-linearly with age, the benefit increase being the greatest
from working the year just before the eligibility for early retirement and declines sharply
after the eligibility for normal retirement2 benefits. This nature of wealth accrual in a DB
plan has two important implications for labor market outcomes of the elderly - first, the
present discounted value of pension benefits accruing from a DB plan decreases by staying
with the employer longer than a certain age, providing a strong incentive to exit the labor
market right after reaching the full potential of the pension plan (normal retirement age).
Secondly it is expensive to cut work hours close to years before retirement as it affects the
entire stream of benefits to be received after retirement. Pension wealth in a DC plan, on
the other hand, is the market value of the current assets accumulated in a portable account,
resulting in an age independent profile of pension wealth accrual. An additional year of
work increases pension wealth by the same amount at any point in the life cycle and a
reduction in hours reduces pension wealth only in the year in which reduced hours are
observed.
In order to understand the age-specific work disincentive provided by DB plans, let’s con-
sider a simple example. Let the DB plan pay 1% of final year salary (before quitting) times
the tenure at the firm. This is capped at tenure and wages at the normal retirement age (say
65 in this case) , i.e. if the worker works beyond age 65 at the same firm, then not only
does he loose the benefits of that additional year but also his higher wage (on account of the
inflation rate/wage growth and extra 1 year of tenure) does not count towards his benefits.
For the DC plan, let’s assume a preset contribution rate (fixed fraction of each year’s salary)
by the employer to a portable bank account which earns a real interest rate of 3%.
Table 2.1 gives a comparison of the nature and timing of wealth accrual under the two plans.
The pension wealth under a DB plan accrues fast with age, reaching it’s full-potential at
age 65 (the normal retirement age of the plan). An additional year of service after age 65
results in roughly 1% loss in the pension wealth and continuing to work further leads to a
significant 21% reduction in benefits. This happens because working after age 65 does not
result in any further increase in the pension benefits but 1 year worth of benefits are lost
as in-service distributions are not allowed. Switching to part-time work in the final year
262 and 65 are the most common early and normal retirement ages respectively
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Table 2.1: Present Value of Accrued Benefits and Marginal Change in Benefits for
Hypothetical Worker with a Defined Benefit or a Defined Contribution Plan
DB DC
Present Value of Accrued Ben-
efits (Constant $)
Marginal Change in
Present Value of Ac-
crued Benefits from
an Additional Year’s
Work (Constant $)
Present Value of Accrued Ben-
efits (Constant $)
Marginal Change in
Present Value of Ac-
crued Benefits from
an Additional Year’s
Work (Constant $)
Current Age Full-time Part-time % lost Full-time % of salary Full-time Part-time % lost Full-time % of salary
30 $144 $72 50 $20 0.26 $8,430 $7,659 9.1 $1,274 8.5
35 $466 $233 50 $42 0.57 $14,124 $13,352 5.4 $1,053 7.02
45 $2,418 $1,209 50 $164 2.2 $22,719 $21,948 3.3 $719 4.8
55 $9,408 $4,704 50 $570 7.6 $28,019 $27,820 2.7 $491 3.28
64 $28,841 $14,420 50 $1,647 21.96 $32,267 $31,496 2.3 $348 2.33
65 $32,538 $16,269 50 $ 1,848 24.65 $32,603 $31,832 2.3 $335 2.24
66 $32,398 $16,199 50 $-70 -0.94 $32,926 $32,155 2.3 $323 2.16
67 $29,196 $14,598 50 $-1,600 -21.35 $33,238 $32,466 2.3 $311 2.08
The present discounted value of pension benefits at age 25 are computed if the worker were to quit (working full-time or part-time in the last
year) at the age in the first column.
Assume worker is paid $7.5 hourly wage with no real wage growth.
Full-time is 2000 annual hours of work and part-time is 1000 hours of work
The normal retirement age of DB plan is 65
Contribution rate for DC plan is set to 14% to match the maximum wealth accruable under DB and DC plan
Inflation rate is 7% and real interest rate is 3%
Source: Columns 2,4 and 5 Adapted from Ellwood [1985]
of service with the pension providing firm results in a flat 50% reduction of DB pension
benefits. This is very different from the wealth accrual under DC plans. After an initial
increase of 8%, the marginal change in the present value of pension in DC plans remains
constant at approximately 2% every year. Unlike DB plans, the wealth accrual under DC
plans does not max out or become negative after a certain age.
2.2.2 Retirement Behavior
I now present empirical evidence of differences in retirement behavior across different
pension plan holders.
Extensive Margin
I observe that people on Defined Benefit plans exit the labor market on an average 3.13 years
earlier than people on Defined Contribution plans. Figure (2.3) shows that participation
rates decline over the life cycle for all three pension groups but the participation for DC
and no pension groups remain systematically higher than DB pension holders.
Intensive Margin
3Retirement is observed to be an absorbing state but this statistic takes into account the first observed exit
from the labor market
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Figure 2.3: Participation of Men
By Pension Plan Type
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Along the intensive margin, I observe that people on Defined Benefit plans work on an
average 2100 annual hours before switching to zero hours. People on Defined Contribution
plans work on an average 1758 annual hours before switching to zero hours and finally
people with no pension plans only work 1300 hours before retiring. Figure (2.4) indicates
that DB pension holder are more likely to move into retirement directly from full-time jobs
and DC pension holders switch into retirement more gradually by taking some part-time
job.
Figure 2.4: Labor Market Transitions for Men
by Pension Plan Type
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Job Switches Before Retirement
Finally I observe that conditional on reducing hours (switching from full-time to part-time
10
Table 2.2: Nature of Full Time to Part-Time Switch
by Pension type (55-65 years)
Mean Age of Switch
Pen. Type Same (%) Diff. (%) Same Diff.
DB 36.43 63.57 60.25 59.68
DC 58.29 41.71 60.40 59.80
No 69.15 30.85 60.48 59.78
work), DB pension holders are more likely to switch jobs and people on DC pension plans
are more likely to reduce hours with the same employer (pension provider) as shown in
Table (2.2). The third row indicates that switching jobs is not preferable at older ages since
people without any pension plans are most likely to stay with the same employers.
2.2.3 Recent Changes
A series of structural, regulatory and demographic changes have taken place in the United
states in the last three decades that are responsible for the shift from DB to DC pension
plans.
First several government regulations were enacted starting early 1980’s which made DC
plans more attractive over DB plans for both for the employer and employee (refer to Ra-
jnes [2002], Iams et al. [2009], Hustead [1998], Gebhardtsbauer and Turner [2004], Gust-
man and Steinmeier [1992]). For instance, the 1978 Revenue Act implemented a provision
which allowed employees to make voluntary contributions to employer-sponsored retire-
ment plans with pretax dollars. Prior to this act, employer contribution to DC accounts
were tax-exempt but employee’s contributions were not tax deductible. Later, Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, reduced incentives
for employers to maintain their DB plans.
The increase in life expectancy and the aging population are other reasons for the decline in
the Defined Benefit plans. Since DB plans are annuitized with a fixed stream of payments
starting upon retirement, an increase in life expectancy directly increases the cost of these
plans relative to DC plans. According to the 2003 report of the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation, years in retirement for an average U.S. male worker increased from 11.5 years
in 1950 to 18.1 years in 2003. Hence the seven additional years of funding increased the
cost of DB plans by a significant amount.
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These regulatory and demographic changes were accompanied by structural changes in the
economy which resulted in occupational shift away from manufacturing towards service
and technology sectors. These newly growing sectors of the economy adopted DC plans
due its lesser regulatory burden. Further, DB plans have long vesting periods and best
suited for jobs with long tenure with the pension provider. The structural changes in the
economy increased job mobility and led to a decline in job tenure. These made Defined
Contribution plans more popular due to their shorter vesting periods and portability across
jobs.
2.3 Theoretical Model
This section presents a stochastic dynamic programming model of retirement, social secu-
rity and private pensions. In order to capture the true nature of retirement incentives for
older workers, retirement benefits from private pension programs and social security are
modeled in great detail to match that of the current U.S system.
Labor supply, savings and social security benefit application decisions of a male household
head is modeled close to the years before retirement. Individuals make these decisions in
every time period t and adjust their behavior in response to uncertainty pertaining to wages,
health, survival, employment (job loss) and rate of return on assets.
At every time period t, t = 55, 56, ..., 95, given an initial stock of assets, pension wealth,
social security wealth and wages, households choose optimal consumption, labor supply
and benefit application (if possible at that age) to maximize the present discounted value of
life-time utility. The dynamic programming model has various components. The following
sections describe each key ingredient in detail.
2.3.1 Preferences
Agents in period t derive utility from consumption ct and leisure lt where the amount of
leisure consumed is dictated by the choice of hours worked ht and the decision to work
with a new or an old employer dt. The within period utility is non-separable4 between
4This work follows [French and Jones, 2011], [French, 2005], [Casanova, 2010] and others in addressing
the ”Retirement-Consumption puzzle”. A decline in consumption at retirement is caused by both- 1) unex-
pected health shocks to leisure causing unplanned retirement and 2) non-separability of preferences between
consumption and leisure.
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consumption and leisure and is given by:
U(ct, ht, dt) =
1
1  ⇢(c
⌫
t l
1 ⌫
t )
(1 ⇢)
Where ⇢ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and ⌫ is the weight on consumption. The
total amount of leisure in period t is given by:
lt = l¯   ht    I{dt = 1}   P I{ht > 0}   HI{mt = bad} (2.1)
Where l¯ is the total endowment of leisure each period, ht is hours worked,   is the psychic
cost of switching employer,  H is the amount of leisure lost due to a bad health shock and
 P is participation cost incurred if hours worked ht are positive. Upon dying an individual
values bequests of any leftover assets at according to the utility function developed by
De Nardi [2004]
b(at) =
✓beq
1  ⇢(at + beq)
(1 ⇢)⌫
The coefficient ✓beq measures the strength of bequest motive and beq measures the curva-
ture of bequest function. Increase in ✓beq increases the marginal utility of a unit of bequest
and increase in beq indicate that the bequest is valued more like a luxury good.
2.3.2 Health and Mortality
Every period individuals are subject to an exogenous health shock which can take two
values mt 2 {good, bad}. Bad health affects individuals in multiple ways – it lowers the
survival probability for the next period, lowers the wages and affects the amount of leisure
consumed. The transition probability for health depends on current health status and age in
the next period. A typical element in the two health transition matrix is given by:
⇡mgood,bad,t+1 = prob(mt+1 = good|mt = bad, t+ 1)
Individuals are also subject to mortality shocks in each period. The survival probability for
the next period depends on age next period and current health status:
⇡st+1 = prob(st+1 = 1|mt)
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2.3.3 Wages
The logarithm of wages in every time period is a function of health and age specific profile
!(mt, aget) and an autoregressive component ⌘t.
logwt = !(mt, t) + ⌘t
⌘t = ⇢w⌘t 1 + ✏wt
✏wt ⇠ N(0,  2✏w) (2.2)
Changing employers does not affect wages in this version of the model.
2.3.4 Budget-Constraint
An individual’s income consist of various components. He receives income through hours
worked in the labor market wtht, spousal income yst, interest on assets r¯at, pension ben-
efits pbDBt from Defined Benefit plan, social security benefits sst (if applied for it) and
government transfers trt if eligible.
Let y(., ⌧) be the level of post-tax income,then the asset accumulation equation is given by:
at+1 =
8><>:
at + y(wtht, yst, r¯at, pbDBt , ⌧) + bt ⇥ ssbt + trt   ct if pen = DB
at + y((1  crw)wtht, yst, r¯at, ⌧) + bt ⇥ ssbt + trt   ct if pen = DC
at + y(wtht, yst, r¯at, ⌧) + bt ⇥ ssbt + trt   ct if pen = NO
(BC)
Where crw is the contribution made by the worker to the DC account 5. While the rate of
return on assets is a risk-free one, there is a stochastic rate of return rt on the balances in a
DC account given by a mean reverting stochastic process [Blau, 2011].
1 + rt = (1 + r¯) exp{ t}
r¯ is the mean rate of return and  t ⇠ N(0,  2 ) is an iid (over time and across individuals)
normal shock. The stochastic rate of return on DC balances captures the key difference
in uncertainty between the two types of pension plans. The rate of return heterogeneity
captures the heterogeneity in portfolio allocation choice which is not modeled here. There
is a borrowing constraint on non-pension assets given by:
at+1   0 8t (LC)
5Employee contribution is only subject to federal payroll taxes.
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and a consumption floor which captures the income and asset tested government programs
like Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid that guarantees a minimum level
of consumption [Hubbard et al., 1995].
ct   c¯ (CF)
Government transfers trt bridge the gap between this minimum level of consumption and
individual’s liquid resources.
trt = min{0, c¯  (at + yt + sst)} (2.3)
2.3.5 Job-Loss
Every period a working individual faces an exogenous probability ⇡  of being laid off from
the current job. Naturally retired individuals do not face any such uncertainty pertaining
to job loss. These job shocks are realized at the end of the period. So at the beginning of
any period, an individual who was working in the previous period can be laid off or not.
Individuals who were not working in the previous period remain retired at the beginning of
the next period. So depending on the exogenous job destruction shock, an individual has
following employment choices to make every period:
dt =
8><>:
{0, 1} working in t  1 &  t = 0
{1} working in t  1 &  t = 1
{1} not working in t  1
The job loss probability is a function of health status and age. It is given by:
⇡ t+1 =
(
prob(  = 1|mt, t+ 1) if ht > 0
0 if ht = 0
2.3.6 Pensions
Like social security, private pensions provide important retirement incentives. Hence I
model the private pension program in the U.S. in detail. Even though there is a wide
variation in the employer provided pension design, they can be broadly classified into two
types – Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution plans (DC) 6.
6There are hybrid plans like such as cash balance plans, and money purchase pension plans, which are
defined contribution plans with a predefined contribution formula.
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Defined Benefit (DB)
DB plans pay a sequence of benefits computed using a predefined formula commencing
upon normal retirement age of the plan until death. Even though there is a wide hetero-
geneity across firms in the formula determining the benefits under a DB plan, the formula
typically depends on age at exit, years of service and the average of the five highest earnings
(last 5 years of service) at the firm.
The model captures some of these important features of the DB pension plan. The DB
pension plans are illiquid until age 62 7. In service distributions are not allowed under DB
plans i.e. a worker has to quit the job with the pension provider (retire or work with a
new employer) to start drawing benefits from the pension plan 8. The pension benefits are
based on tenure, age at exit and Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) like social
security. The restricted Health and Retirement Survey data has pension plan information
from the employers of HRS respondents who gave permission. The data comes with a
pension calculation software. I use pension software to compute the DB benefits for the
respondents in my sample. I then run a regression with pension benefits as the explanatory
variable and tenure, and age dummies to back out the dependence of pension benefits on
tenure for an average pension plan. I use the estimates from Gustman and Steinmeier
[1999] for the AIME related coefficients. Pension benefits are computed as:
pbDBt = ↵0tent + ↵1ssbt + (↵2,0 + ↵2,1t+ ↵2,2t
2) ·max{0, ssbt   1}
+ (↵3,0 + ↵3,1t+ ↵3,2t
2) ·max{0, ssbt   2}
Defined Contribution (DC)
Pension wealth under a DC plan is characterized by an account balance with employer and
worker contribution rates. As long as the individual works for the DC pension provider,
both the employer and the employee contribute a fixed fraction of the employee’s pre-tax
labor earnings to the account. The stochastic rate of return on assets in this account captures
7Gustman et al. [2010] reports that the average normal retirement age for the HRS cohort using the 1992
employer data is 61.8
8Under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA, a defined benefit plan could only permit a distribution of
benefits at termination of employment, retirement, termination of the plan or total and permanent disability
of the participant. Later in 2006 some of these restrictions were relaxed. The Pension Protection Act of 2006
(PPA) and it’s finalization in 2007 (the ”Final PPA Regulations”) provided rules permitting distributions from
DB plans upon normal retirement age and after age 62. But since most of the individuals in my estimation
sample are older than 70 years in 2006, these laws do not affect them
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the risk that the worker bears as opposed to benefits in a DB plans which has no risk. Even
though in practice, individuals can choose to claim benefits and roll over the funds into
a tax-sheltered Individual Retirement Account (IRA) (or transfer the money to the new
employer’s plan or take a lump-sum payment at a penalty), I do not model any claiming
decisions. I also assume for simplicity that in-service distributions are not allowed. That
is as long as the worker works for the pension provider, the wealth is illiquid9 and there
are fixed contributions to the account every period. Once the worker leaves the pension
provider, then the funds are transferred as a lump-some to the non-pension account of the
worker and there is no uncertainty pertaining to the rate of return.
qdct+1 =
(
[qdct + (crw + cre)wtht](1 + rt+1) if with DC provider
qdct (1 + rt+1) if aget  59 & with new employer
(2.4)
2.3.7 Social Security
The Social Security system in the U.S. provides retirement incentives at the time when these
retirement benefits become available. The benefits are computed in several steps. First
the earnings of the 35 highest earnings years are averaged into an index. It increases by
working an extra year if earnings in that year is higher than the lowest earnings embedded
in the index. Indexed lifetime earnings are also capped at some threshold. Then this index
is converted to obtain the primary insurance amount (PIA) which determines the social
security benefits. Let et be the social security wealth in the model (measure of indexed
lifetime earnings). Then the social security wealth evolution is approximated in the model
in the following simple way:
et+1 = max{(et +max{0, (wtht   et)/35}), emax}
The social security benefits are a piecewise linear function of social security wealth. It is
computed in the following way:
ssbt = t

0.90⇥min{et, b0}+ 0.32⇥min{max{et   b0, 0}, b1   b0}
+0.15⇥max{et   b1, 0}
 
9In practice there is a penalty for claiming the DC account balance before age 59 12 . If my model, the DC
wealth is illiquid until age 60
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The social security benefits provide three major work dis-incentives after age 62. First the
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings is only recomputed upwards if current earnings are
greater than previous year of work. For instance staying longer in the labor market by
working part-time does not increase the benefits. Secondly benefits can be first claimed at
the early retirement age (ERA) which is 62. For every year before the normal retirement
age (NRA) which is age 65 that the benefits are claimed, they are reduced by 6.7%. This
is actuarially fair. But for every year after the NRA that the benefit application is delayed,
benefits are increased by 3% which is actuarially unfair. Hence there is a strong incentive
to draw benefits by age 65. Finally the social security earnings test taxes the labor income
for the social security beneficiaries at a very high rate if the earnings are above a certain
threshold till the age of 70. All these features are captured in the model.
2.3.8 State-Space
The state space xt consists of a permanent pension type (pen 2 {DB,DC,NO}), age of
the individual at time t, continuous variables related to wealth and earnings – assets (at),
wages (wt), social security wealth (et), DC balances (qdct ) and DB pension wealth (qDBt ).
There is a discrete health related variable indicating bad health (mt 2 {good, bad}), so-
cial security application status (bt 1 2 {0, 1}) and two discrete variable indicating the
labor market status. Previous period participation status (pt 1 2 {0, 1, 2}) indicating non-
participation, participation with pension employer and participation with non-pension em-
ployer respectively. And finally an indicator for being laid off or not ( t 2 {0, 1}).
2.3.9 Timing
The timing in the model is as follows: individuals wake up and observe their fixed pension
plan type pen, age and current state xt = (at, et, wt, qDCt , tent,mt, bt 1, t, pt 1) at the
beginning of every period t. If currently laid off, he chooses whether to retire, hours to
work for the new employer conditional on participation decision, consumption and whether
to receive social security if eligible. If not laid off currently, then he also makes a decision
to switch employers. Shocks to wages, health, rate of return and job loss are realized
2.3.10 Recursive Formulation
Individuals solve a finite-horizon Markovian decision problem where they choose a se-
quence of consumption {c(xt)}Tt=1, hours {h(xt)}Tt=1, social security benefit application
{b(xt)}Tt=1 and employment {d(xt)}Tt=1 rules to maximize the expected discounted life-
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time utility subject to the exogenous processes for health transition, survival, job loss and
wage determination, a set of budget (DB), borrowing (LC) and time constraint (2.1), gov-
ernment transfer rule (2.3), private pension wealth accrual and policies for taxes and Social
Security.
The value function is a solution to a bellman equation given below. For exposition purposes,
the bellman equation for each discrete employment scenario has been written separately.
Not Laid off
If an individual was working in the previous period and not laid off at the end of the period,
then in the current period he chooses both hours to work in the labor market and whether
to work for period t  1 employer or not. So he has three employment choices - work with
the same employer, work with a different employer or retire. A job with a new employer is
available in every period. If hours worked in the current period are positive, then he faces
the uncertainty of losing his current job in the future period. If he chooses to work zero
hours in the current period (retire), then there is no uncertainty about job loss in the future
period.
Work with same employer
V (xt) = max{ct,ht2R+,bt}
(
U(ct, ht, dt = 0) +  ⇡
s
t+1
Z
V (xt+1|xt)dF (xt+1|xt)
+  (1  ⇡st+1)b(at+1)
)
s.t (BC), (LC) and (CF)
Work with different employer
V (xt) = max{ct,ht2R+,bt}
(
U(ct, ht, dt = 1) +  ⇡
s
t+1
Z
V (xt+1|xt)dF (xt+1|xt)
+  (1  ⇡st+1)b(at+1)
)
s.t (BC), (LC) and (CF)
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Not work
V (xt) = max{ct,bt}
(
U(ct, ht = 0, dt = 0) +  ⇡
s
t+1
Z
V (xt+1|xt)dF (xt+1|xt)
+  (1  ⇡st+1)b(at+1)
)
s.t (BC), (LC) and (CF)
Laid off
If an individual was working in the previous period and laid off at the end of the period,
then in the current period he only chooses the amount of hours to work in the labor market
(with a new employer). A job with a new employer is available in every period. If hours
worked in the current period are positive, then he faces the uncertainty of losing his current
job in the future period. If he chooses to work zero hours in the current period (retire), then
there is no uncertainty about job loss in the future period.
Work with different employer
V (xt) = max{ct,ht2R+,bt}
(
U(ct, ht, dt = 1) +  ⇡
s
t+1
Z
V (xt+1|xt)dF (xt+1|xt)
+  (1  ⇡st+1)b(at+1)
)
s.t (BC), (LC) and (CF)
Not work
V (xt) = max{ct,bt}
(
U(ct, ht = 0, dt = 0) +  ⇡
s
t+1
Z
V (xt+1|xt)dF (xt+1|xt)
+  (1  ⇡st+1)b(at+1)
)
s.t (BC), (LC) and (CF)
Individuals who were retired in the previous period solve the same problem as working
individuals who were laid off at the end of the period.
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2.4 Data
The model is estimated using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 10 for
the years 1992-2010. The HRS is a longitudinal sample of non-institutionalized individ-
uals, over the age of 50. The first cohort (born in 1931-1941) was interviewed in 1992
and subsequently every two years. Along with the age-eligible respondents, the survey
also interviewed the spouses or partners of the respondents. The HRS has a rich source
of information on demographics, different measures of health status (subjective and objec-
tive), financial wealth, private pensions, social security, government transfers, income from
work, labor market activity and retirement. For those respondents who gave permission
to access their administrative records, the HRS data can be matched to the Social Secu-
rity Administration (SSA) earnings data and pension plan information from the employers.
These provide very accurate measure of social security and pension wealth accrued from
both DB and DC plans. I use the restricted SSA administrative data and pension plan data
to construct a measure of social security and pension wealth held by the individuals in the
model at the beginning of the life-cycle.
I use data on male household heads with either a DB, DC or no pension plan. Since the
theoretical model in this essay does not allow for combination pension plans, individuals on
hybrid plans are dropped from the sample. I also drop observations on account of missing
values for hours, wages and assets. Since self-employed workers face different financial
incentives for reducing hours (not captured in my model), I drop self employed individuals.
This reduces my sample to 5,130 individuals.
In order to make sure that the individuals in my model face similar social security and
pension rules, I fit my model to the initial HRS cohort aged 51-61 in 1992. But I use all 10
waves of data to estimate the stochastic processes faced by the individuals.
2.5 Estimation
This section describes the estimation strategy. I use a two-step estimation procedure on the
lines of Gourinchas and Parker [2002]. In the first step, I estimate or calibrate parameters
which can be cleanly identified without using the structural model. This parameter vector
is given by   = (⇡m, ⇡s, ⇡ ,!(.), ⇢w,  ✏,   , crw, cre, r¯, ⌧, ssbt, pbDBt , c¯). I estimate the
health transitions, wage process, survival and job loss probability from the HRS data in
the first step. In the second step, I estimate the vector of preference parameters ⇥ =
10The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number
NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan
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(l¯,  , ⇢, ⌫, ✓beq, H , P , ) using Method of Simulated Moments (MSM).
2.5.1 Initial Conditions
Initial conditions (state vector at the start of life cycle) are generated by taking random
draws from the empirical joint distribution of household assets, wages, pension wealth
(held under both Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution plans), health status, tenure and
pension plan type for those who are working with their pension provider or do not have any
pension plan. No one is laid off or retired at the beginning of the life cycle.
2.5.2 Method of Simulated Moments
Given the vector of exogenous data generating processes   and some vector of prefer-
ence parameters ⇥, I solve for the decision rules c(xt, ,⇥), d(xt, ,⇥), b(xt, ,⇥) and
d(xt, ,⇥). I then use the estimated   and initial conditions x0 to simulate the life cycle
profiles of hypothetical individuals. Finally a MSM criterion function is used to find ⇥ˆ that
minimizes the distance between aggregated simulated profiles and data profiles.
Moments Matched
I match the following moments to estimate the elements of ⇥
1. Participation by pension plan type and age resulting in 3⇥ T moment conditions.
2. Log of hours worked conditional on working by pension plan type and age resulting
in 3⇥ T moment conditions.
3. Employer switches by pension plan type and age resulting in 3 ⇥ T moment condi-
tions.
4. Log of hours worked conditional on working by health status and age resulting in
2⇥ T moment conditions.
5. Participation by health status and age resulting in 2⇥ T moment conditions.
6. Mean assets by age resulting in T moment condition
This gives a total of 14⇥T moment conditions. Formally the MSM estimate ⇥ˆMSM is one
that solves:
⇥ˆMSM = argmin g˜(⇥, )WT g˜(⇥, )
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Where
g˜(⇥, )| {z }
14T⇥1
=
26666666666666666666666664
1
N
NX
i=1
{log hjit   log h˜jt(xit,⇥, )}
1
N
NX
i=1
{pjit   p˜jt(xit,⇥, )}
1
N
NX
i=1
{djit   d˜jt(xit,⇥, )}
1
N
NX
i=1
{log hmit   log h˜mt (xit,⇥, )}
1
N
NX
i=1
{pmit   p˜mt (xit,⇥, )}
1
N
NX
i=1
{ait   a˜t(xit 1,⇥, )}
37777777777777777777777775
t = {1, ..., T} j 2 {DB,DC,NO} m 2 {good, bad}
WT could be an optimal weighting matrix given by the inverse of a consistent estimate
of the covariance matrix of data moments. However efficient choice of weighting matrix
could introduce finite sample bias [Altonji and Segal, 1996]. Hence I use the following
non-optimal weighting matrix for the structural estimation:
WT|{z}
14T⇥14T
=
"
diag
⇣
var
  1p
N
NX
i=1
mit
 ⌘# 1
Wheremit is a vector of data moments
2.5.3 Selection
The main issue with this analysis is the assumption of the exogeneity of pension plans. In
other words if agents with some unobserved preferences for early retirement are systemati-
cally selecting into jobs with DB pension plans, then the resulting retirement behavior will
not be driven by the pension plan but these preferences themselves. In that case the model
developed here will be overstating the impact of the different pension plans in generating
differences in retirement behavior. One way to solve this problem would be to account
for self selection in the model by building in unobserved preference heterogeneity on the
lines of French and Jones [2011]. But one of the strengths of this model lies in it’s ability
to generate the differences in retirement behavior solely by a more accurate description of
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the budget constraint. Hence without a strong empirical evidence of selection into pension
plans, it seems undesirable to resort to a more complicated description of preferences.
The Health and Retirement Survey Data contains subjective answers to some preference
based questions asked to the retirement age population. I use the answers to three of these
questions in a multinomial logit analysis to predict the probability of being in a particular
pension plan. Table 2.3 reports the predicted probability of being in a particular pension
plan conditional on answering yes to the respective preference based questions. The results
indicate mixed evidence for selection. For instance the predicted probability of being in a
DB plan is the lowest conditional on answering yes to the question “Do you look forward
to retirement?”. If people with high preference for leisure or early retirement were self
selecting into DB plans then this probability should have been the highest. On the other
hand, column 2 of the same table indicate that a person is most likely to be without any
pension plan and least likely to be in a DB plan conditional on answering yes to the question
“Would you like to retire gradually”. This seems to be somewhat consistent with selection.
Table 2.3: Predicted Probability of having a DB, DC or NO Pension Plan
from Multinomial Logit Regression
Pension Group Q1 (Yes) Q2 (Yes) Q3 (Yes)
DB 0.2521 0.1682 0.1959
DC 0.3794 0.3387 0.3712
NO 0.3683 0.4930 0.4328
Q1 Do you look forward to retirement?
Q2 Would you like to retire gradually?
Q3 Would you like to work even if you don’t need the
money?
2.6 Results
This section reports the results related to the structural estimation of preference parameters
using MSM, model-fit and simulations from the estimated model.
2.6.1 Preference Parameter Estimates
The structural model is used to estimate two key parameters currently, the participation
cost and the cost of switching employer. The value of other parameters are currently fixed
(taken from French [2005])11 in the estimation. Both  P and   are measured in terms
of hours. The estimates in Table (2.4) indicate that 106 hours are lost in switching an
11Details of all other parameters are presented in Appendix A.2
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employer, i.e, choosing to work with a new employer. Participation in the labor market is
expensive at older ages and cost 845 hours of time. This estimate of participation cost is
30% smaller than the model estimated with a single DB pension plan for all. In this model
the average participation and hours for each age are matched to the average in the data
without exploiting the variation in retirement behavior across pension plan types.
Table 2.4: Preference Parameter Estimates
Parameter and Definition (1) (2)
 P fixed cost of work 845
(12)
1178
(15)
  cost of switching employer 106
(4)
-
(1) Model with pension plan heterogene-
ity
(2) Model with a single DB plan for all
(without employer switching)
Identification of Participation Cost
Participation cost is identified from the hours worked and participation profiles or in other
words hours worked before switching to non-participation (zero hours of work). Usually
a high participation cost ( ⇡ 1300 annual hours) is required to generate the same drop
in hours in the model as observed in the data. This means that there is some unobservable
component of preferences (not captured by the model ingredients) which are responsible for
this big discontinuity in the life cycle hours profile. The data exhibits interesting variation
in both hours worked and participation across three groups of retirement age population –
DB, DC and No pension holders.
The model in this essay is constructed (capturing details of the different pension plans) such
that these differences are originating solely from the differences in the budget constraint of
these groups (and not due to differences in preferences). I match hours, participation and
job switches for the three pension groups to jointly estimate two parameters - participation
cost and cost of job switch in terms of annual hours. The variation in these moments for
these different types carry identifying information. First the model cannot generate any
incentive for the no pension group to endogenously switch employers but the DB pension
groups use switching to mitigate the loss in pension wealth in the event of reducing hours.
Hence, allowing for job switches from pension providing firms result in more variation in
hours across the DB pension holders. This mechanism results in a small fraction of DB
pension types working less than 2000 hours with a different employer in the event of bad
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health shock. Second, only a small fraction (DB pension holders) of the data population
sees the sharp drop in hours. The behavior is more gradual for the other two groups. So
when we match the behavior of the three groups in the model jointly to their counterparts in
the data (1), the averaging behavior results in a participation cost which is smaller than the
one estimated on DB population solely (2). And finally there is variation in the magnitude
of the drop in hours generated by the budget constraint across the three groups. The budget
constraint cannot generate most of the observed drop in hours for the no pension group. The
only mechanism that can generate abrupt retirement for this pension group is participation
cost (other than health shocks, switching cost and social security which are also common
for all). On the other hand, the budget constraint for the DB pension group can generate
part of the drop in hours worked before retirement. For all these reasons, earlier estimates
of participation cost, obtained by matching the average behavior in the data to that of a DB
pension holder in the model, potentially suffers from an upward bias.
The participation cost has implications for the labor elasticities along the intensive and ex-
tensive margin. A high participation cost generates large reservation hours. This results in
most of the response of labor supply to wage changes along the participation margin and
very little action along the intensive margin. The model in this essay has three groups of
agents facing a common relatively lower participation cost (in time) of work but different
monetary costs (in terms of loss in pension wealth) of reducing hours. Since the model
generates more variation in hours for these pension groups, the resulting elasticities are
different from those computed using a standard model with no pension wealth heterogene-
ity. Participation elasticities are 29% lower and hours elasticities are 58% higher as seen
in Table (2.5).
Table 2.5: Elasticities
Wage Elasticity at age 60 (1) (2)
Extensive Margin 0.8743 1.248
Intensive Margin 0.4562 0.1904
Wages at age 60 are reduced by 15% to compute the
participation and hours elasticity
2.6.2 Model-fit
The model is able to fit participation rates by DB and DC pension plans well for the fixed
parameter values and reasonable values of participation cost and switching cost. Figure
2.5a shows the participation rates in the data and model for Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution pension holders over ages 55 to 69. Defined Contribution plan holders in
the model have higher participation rates on account of two reasons. First they hold less
in pension wealth as compared to those on Defined Benefit pension plans. Second the
marginal returns to staying a year longer with an employer for them remains fixed at 9%
of their labor earnings at all ages. The marginal returns to staying a year longer for DB
pension holders drop sharply at age 62. This results in most of the exits observed at age
62 from the labor market. Social security also provides strong work dis-incentives at older
ages. The model is able to generate the age 62 and 65 peaks in retirement as observed in
the data (Figure 2.5b).
Figure 2.5: Model vs. Data
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2.6.3 Simulations
The estimated model is used to simulate the effect of a complete phase out from DB to DC
pension plans on participation rates. To this effect, all DB pension plans at the beginning of
the life cycle are changed to DC plans without changing the pension wealth. The estimated
model predicts that increasing the DC pension composition by 32% result in a 17% increase
in the participation rates for the age group 57 to 69 and 13% increase for the 60 to 65 years
old. The increase is mainly due the the removal of age 62 work disincentive provided by
the DB plans to exit the labor market.
2.7 Conclusion
In this essay, a stochastic dynamic programming model of retirement, savings, social secu-
rity and pension wealth is estimated. The model allows for a very rich and precise formu-
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Table 2.6: Pension Plan Composition
Pension Plan Benchmark Policy Change
DB 52% 0% # 52%
DC 32% 84% " 52%
NO 16% 16% -
Table 2.7: Labor force participation
Age Group Benchmark Policy Change
57-69 35% 52% " 17%
60-65 31% 44% " 13%
lation of the budget constraint with respect of the retirement wealth. More specifically, it
allows for pension wealth accrual through both Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
pension plans. DB plans in the model provide age specific incentive to retire as seen in
practice whereas DC plans provide a fixed age-independent profile of wealth accrual with
uncertainty pertaining to the rate of return.
Estimation results show that it is expensive to change employers. The participation cost
estimated here is 35% lower as compared to some other estimates in the literature. The
value of this model lies in it’s ability to predict labor supply changes in response to changes
in pension plan composition. An increase in DC plan composition by 32% in the estimated
model, result in an increase in the participation rates of the 57 to 69 years old by 17%
and 60 to 65 years old by 13%. This indicates that 43% of the recent increase in the
labor force participation of the older workers can be mapped to the change in pension plan
composition.
Ignoring pension plan variation a model can account for none of the variation in retirement
behavior observed in the data while the model developed in this essay with homogenous
preferences and pension plan heterogeneity can account for 67% of the variation across
pension plans in participation and 71% variation in hours conditional on participation.
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Chapter 3
Consumer Learning, Product
Differentiation, and The Value of
Generic Pharmaceutical Entry
The research outlined in this essay was conducted in collaboration with Prof. Amil Petrin,
Prof. Pinar Karaca-Mandic and Prof. Jeffery McCullough. For this research, we use
a 5% sample of Medicare claims requested from the Center of Medicare and Medicaid
services (CMS). We have the necessary Data Use Agreement (DUA) for publishing the
results of this research in our upcoming paper of the same title. However, CMS requires
a separate Data Use Agreement for publishing any results obtained using the data as part
of a dissertation. Due to these constraints, this essay only contains a brief overview of the
project. The author would like to direct the readers to the forthcoming paper “Consumer
Learning, Product Differentiation, and The Value of Generic Pharmaceutical Entry” for
results and more details.
3.1 Introduction
Prescription pharmaceuticals constitute a large and growing portion of medical expendi-
tures. Pharmaceutical costs - and incentive innovation incentives - are generated by patent
protection. Patent expiration results in generic entry for most products and a market re-
duction in prices. Generic products have chemically equivalent active ingredients (i.e., the
exact same molecule) and typically yield the same clinical benefits. Generic entry gener-
ally results in lower health expenditures, increased access, and higher short-run consumer
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surplus. The benefits of generic entry may be reduced by both firm strategies and consumer
information barriers.
Pharmaceutical firms may develop follow-on products, often referred to as line extensions.
These products often constitute real clinical innovation including formulations that can
increase patient compliance or lower side effects. Line extensions may, however, reduce or
delay consumers’ adoption of generic competitors. Given the difficulty consumers face in
learning about pharmaceutical value, line extensions may effectively differentiate products
in excess of any efficacy or side effect differences. This is particularly important as the line
extensions often face later generic entry dates.1 These products are employed to effectively
extend patent life.
Medicare Part D (created under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003) provides outpa-
tient prescription drug coverage to seniors and to people under the age of 65 with certain
disabilities. Ever since it went to effect in 2006, it has been the center of much policy
debate due to the substantial cost of the program. For instance, Part D cost the government
$62 billion in 2010, constituting 12% of total federal spending for Medicare for that year
2. The spending is projected to rise to 14% of total Medicare spending in 2015 and to 17%
by 2023. This would result in a 6% per capita growth rate of federal spending on the Part
D program 3.
A large fraction of the federal government’s spending on the Medicare Part D program is
incurred on the payment for brand name drugs. According to the report by the Congres-
sional Budget Office4, generic drugs which formed 73% of the total number of prescription
filled under Part D in 2010, constituted only 13% ($21 billion) of the total prescription
drug costs. Whereas brand name drugs, which only formed 27% of the prescription filled,
resulted in 87% ($141 billion) of the total cost. A lot of these brand-name drugs are also
available in generic versions and it has been argued by policy makers that a higher level of
utilization of these generic drugs would result in significant cost savings for the government
[Haas et al. [2005] Shrank et al. [2010], Frank [2007] Fischer and Avorn [2004], Rizzo and
Zeckhauser [2009]]. However, the cost savings of forcing consumers onto generics may
lead to large welfare losses for consumers of non-generic alternatives if they highly value
1Later generic dates often occur when line extensions are delayed beyond patent expiration when intro-
duced late in a patent period followed by a lengthy FDA approval process. In relatively small product markets
line extensions may never face generic competition.
2Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Office of
the Actuary, 2011 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds (May 2011)
3Kaiser Family Foundation, The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Fact Sheet, September 2014
4July 2014 CBO report “Competition and the Cost of Medicares Prescription Drug Program”
30
them. A significant literature in Medicine and Public Health report that generic substitution
can result in non-adherence, reduction in medication effectiveness or even adverse health
outcomes in certain treatments [Crawford et al. [2006], VanWijk et al. [2006], Kjoenniksen
et al. [2006], Kanis et al. [2012], Duerden and Hughes [2010]].
We address this issue by analyzing the welfare implications of generic substitution. For
our welfare analysis, we estimate a structural model of drug demand that allows for het-
erogeneity in match quality between consumers and drugs and also allows for consumer
learning about the stochastic match quality of the drug. In doing so we build on and ex-
tend a rich literature on discrete choice demand model [McFadden et al. [1973], Rosen
and Small [1979b], Trajtenberg [1985], Berry [1994], Petrin [2001]] and Bayesian learning
models [insert citations]. Our framework is similar to that of [Crawford and Shum, 2005]
and [Shin et al., 2012] .
For our analysis we focus on the osteoporosis (OP) market in the U.S. over the period 2007
and 2008. The osteoporosis market includes the presence of several branded drugs and one
generic drug which is an exact bio-equivalent for one of the brand drugs Fosamax. This
makes it an interesting case for analyzing the welfare implications of generic substitution.
The OP market is also a significant market in terms of disease prevalence and pharmaceu-
tical revenues 5.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Overview
We estimate a structural model of pharmaceutical demand where patients are uncertain
about drug match quality, are risk neutral and myopic. Patients receive signals of the match
quality through drug use and update their expectations about match quality in a Bayesian
manner as they receive future signals.
The model specification and the assumptions underlying the Bayesian learning model of
drug demand are laid out in the rest of the section.
5Blume and Curtis [2011] report that roughly 30% of Medicare beneficiaries were treated for either frac-
tures or OP without fractures with an estimated health care cost of $16 billion in the U.S. in 2002
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3.2.2 Utility Function
Consumer i’s utility from purchasing brand j of the osteoporosis drug at time t is given by:
Uijt =  ij,t 1 + ↵Xij,t + ✏ij,t (3.1)
where  ij,t denotes patient i’s beliefs about the stochastic match quality of drug j at time
t. Xij,t is the out-of pocket price paid by patient i for drug j at time t and ↵ is the price
coefficient. Finally ✏ij,t is a patient-drug and time- specific shock. Notice that the utility is
stochastic because the belief about the match quality is stochastic but ✏ij,t while unobserved
by the econometrician, is not stochastic from the point of view of the patient. We assume
that ✏ij,t is iid Type I Extreme Value distribution. The patient is assumed to maximize her
expected utility given by:
UEijt = E[Uijt] = E[ ij,t 1] + ↵Xijt + ✏ij,t (3.2)
3.2.3 Learning Process
Following the literature on Bayesian learning process (Crawford and Shum [2005], Erdem
and Keane [1996], Ackerberg [2003], Shin et al. [2012] and so on), we assume that a single
instance of drug use does not reveal it’s match quality. Patients learn about the match
quality by updating their beliefs over successive use of alternative drugs. More specifically,
they receive a noisy signal of match quality after each experience of a particular drug and
combine the information contained in the signal with their prior beliefs to obtain posterior
beliefs about the drug in accordance with the Bayes’s rule.
Quality Signal
Let qij,t be the quality signal about drug j’s match that patient i received after consuming
drug j at time t. We assume that quality signals follow a normal distribution:
qij,t ⇠ N( ij,  2qij) (3.3)
Where  ij is patient i’s true mean match quality for drug j and  2qij is the variance of the
quality signal for drug j faced by patient i. This implies that learning happens over multiple
drug experience occasions and the quality signal is a noisy measure of the true mean match
quality .
Prior Beliefs
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Every patient is newly diagnosed with osteoporosis at time t = 0 and has no experience
with osteoporosis treatment drugs. Hence the patient has no information about her match
quality with different drugs. But the patient has prior beliefs about the match quality of
the drug. Patient i0s belief about the match quality of drug j has the following normal
distribution:
 ij,0 ⇠ N(µ ij,0 ,  2 ij,0) (3.4)
Where µ ij,0 and  2 ij,0 are patient i’s initial beliefs of the mean and variance of drug j’s
match quality.
Posterior Beliefs
When the patient experiences drug j at time t = 1 she receives a quality signal which
she uses to update her beliefs about the match quality in a Bayesian manner. Since the
prior belief at time t = 0 and all subsequent quality signals are assumed to be normally dis-
tributed, it follows that the posterior belief at every time period is also normally distributed.
Hence the evolution of posterior beliefs can be fully characterized by the laws of motion
for posterior mean and variance.
The posterior mean and variance are updated in the following recursive fashion using Bay’s
rule:
µ ij,t =
 2 ij,t
 2 ij,t 1
µ ij,t 1 + dij,t
 2 ij,t
 2 ij
qij,t (3.5)
 2 ij,t =
1
1
 2 ij,t 1
+ dij,t
1
 2 ij
(3.6)
where dij,t is an indicator variable such that:
dij,t =
(
1 if drug j taken in period t,
0 otherwise
Iterating forward Equations 3.5 and3.6 we get the following expressions for the mean and
33
variance of the match quality at time t
µ ij,t =
 2 ij,t
 2 ij,0
µ ij,0 +
tX
⌧=1
dij,⌧qij,⌧
 2 ij,t
 2 ij
(3.7)
 2 ij,t =
1
1
 2 ij,0
+
Pt
⌧=1 dij,⌧
 2 ij
(3.8)
Following Shin et al. [2012] we do the following change of variables to write down an
alternate expression for the Bayesian learning process:
⌫ij,t = µ ij,t    ij (3.9)
⌘ij,t = qij,t    ij (3.10)
Where ⌫ij,t is referred as the “perception bias ” and represents deviation of patients i’s belief
about the mean quality from the true mean quality of the match. ⌘ij,t is the signal noise.
This transformation results in the following expression for the evolution of the posterior
mean of the match quality of drug j with patient i:
µ ij,0 =  ij + ⌫ij,0 (t = 0)
µ ij,1 =  ij + ⌫ij,1 =  ij +
 2 ij
 2 ij,0
⌫ij,0 + dij,1⌘ij,1
 2 ij
 2 ij,0
+ dij,1
(t = 1)
...
µ ij,k =  ij + ⌫ij,k =  ij +
 2 ij
 2 ij,0
⌫ij,0 +
Pk
⌧=1 dij,⌧⌘ij,⌧
 2 ij
 2 ij,0
+
Pk
⌧=1 dij,⌧
(t = k)
...
µ ij,t⇤ =  ij + ⌫ij,t⇤ =  ij (t = t⇤)
Where t⇤ is the time when a patient’s belief about match quality converges to the the true
match quality and learning stops. Using this expression for the evolution of posterior beliefs
about the mean match quality of the drug, the expected utility in equation 3.2 can be re-
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written as:
UEijt = ij + ⌫ijt 1 + ↵Xij,t + ✏ij,t
= ij +
 2 ij
 2 ij,0
⌫ij,0 +
Pt 1
⌧=1 dij,⌧⌘ij,⌧
 2 ij
 2 ij,0
+
Pt 1
⌧=1 dij,⌧
+Xij,t↵ + ✏ij,t
Notice that the distributional assumptions on ✏ij,t result in a random coefficient multinomial
logit model where product-specific intercepts are composed of true mean match quality
( ij) and perception bias (⌫ij,t 1).
3.3 Identification
The parameters of the Bayesian learning process { ij,  2 ij , ⌫ij,0,  2 ij,0} 8i, j are not identi-
fiable in the current form. Following [Shin et al., 2012] we make the following identifying
assumptions. First we normalize the quality signal variance  2 ij to 1 as both the qual-
ity signal variance 2 ij and the variance of the initial belief about the match quality  
2
 ij,0
cannot be identified separately but only their ratio
 2 ij
 2 ij,0
can be identified. Individual-level
mean and variance of initial quality perception {⌫ij,0,  2 ij,0} is generally identified by using
survey information or advertising data collected prior to the choices being observed. Since
this information is not available to us, we restrict the priors to be homogeneous across
consumers. More specifically we restrict ⌫ij,0 = ⌫¯j, (⌫¯J = 0) and  2 ij,0 =  ¯
2
 0 .
The true mean quality of the drug  ij is identified by the steady state drug choice of the
patient. As the patient receives quality signals over successive drug experiences, learning
occurs and the beliefs about match quality evolves to the true match quality of the drug. In
our data set, we observe drug choices of patients for 24 months after being diagnosed with
osteoporosis. This gives us a long enough time series to correctly identify the true mean
quality. Further, not all drug-specific  ij’s are identified, hence we normalize one of them
( iJ = 0).
3.4 Estimation
We use the Bayesian method of inference to estimate the parameters of the model. We use
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) scheme to draw from the stationary joint posterior
density of the parameters. The details of the MCMC sampler are provided in Appendix B.1
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The set of parameters to be estimated is given by ⇥ = { i}Ni ⇥ where
 i = { i1, . . . ,  iJ 1, {⌘ij,t}Ti 1⌧=1 } represent a set of individual level parameters
and  = {⌫¯1, . . . , ⌫¯J 1,  ¯2 0 ,↵} are the aggregate level parameters. The liklihood function
is given by:
Li(di|Xi; i, ) =
TiY
t=1
JY
J=1
✓
exp(U¯Eij,t)P
j0 exp(U¯
E
ij0,t)
◆dij,t
3.5 Baseline Results
Please refer to the upcoming paper “Consumer Learning, Product Differentiation, and The
Value of Generic Pharmaceutical Entry” by Neha Bairoliya, Amil Petrin, Pinar Karaca-
Mandic and Jeffery McCullough for estimation results.
3.6 Counterfactual Policy Simulations
To understand the welfare implications of generic substitution we model demand under
alternative cost sharing policies. Once the generic becomes available in 2008, individuals
pay for the full price of the branded versions of Alendronate, Fosamax and Fosamax Plus
D. The full market prices for one month supplies of Fosamax and Fosamax Plus D are
approximately $130 and $165 respectively. We then evaluate expenditures and welfare
changes by means of compensating variation. Following Train [1998] and Rosen and Small
[1979a], our measure of compensating variation for household i is given by:
CVi =
log[
PJ
j=1 exp(V
1
ij)]  log[
PJ
j=1 exp(V
0
ij)]
↵
Where V 1ij and V 0ij are expected utilities as defined in equation (3.2) post and pre price
change respectively. CVi is then averaged across all agents to obtain an average dollar
amount for each individual in the population. In this setting, CV could be interpreted as
either a welfare loss or an information barrier. We compare the cost savings and the CV
under alternative assumptions.
For the first policy scenario, we individuals pay for the full price of Fosamax after the
generic Alendronate becomes available. For the second policy scenario, individuals pay for
the full price of both Fosamax and it’s line extension, Fosamax Plus D, once Alendronate
becomes available. Please refer to the upcoming paper “Consumer Learning, Product Dif-
ferentiation, and The Value of Generic Pharmaceutical Entry” by Neha Bairoliya, Amil
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Petrin, Pinar Karaca-Mandic and Jeffery McCullough for results.
3.7 Conclusion
We estimate a structural model of drug demand allowing for heterogeneity in match quality
between consumers and drugs and also allowing for consumer learning about the stochas-
tic match quality of the drug. Estimates from the Bayesian learning model suggest that
there are significant welfare losses to consumers from generic substitution. Furthermore,
naive models seriously underestimate price elasticities for branded pharmaceuticals. We
analyze a policy scenario where agents pay the full price of the brand drug once it’s generic
becomes available (Fosamax in our case). The compensating variations we compute may
be interpreted as a welfare loss if consumers are fully informed or they may represent an
information barrier. In either case, we find that the cost savings from increased generic
substitution excede the welfare losses associated with this policy change.
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Appendix A
Supplemental Material to Effect of
Pension Plan Type on Retirement
Behavior
A.1 Mathematical Appendix
This section outlines the method for solving the dynamic programming problem of the
individuals described earlier. It describes in detail the computation of the decision rules
and methods for integrating the value function with respect to uncertainty.
A.1.1 Numerical Method
The value function is a solution to the following finite-horizon Markovian decision prob-
lem:
V (xt) = max{ct,ht,bt,dt}
(
U(ct, ht, dt) +  (1  ⇡st+1)

⇡ t+1
Z
Vt+1(xt+1|xt)dF (xt+1|xt)
+ (1  ⇡ t+1)
Z
Vt+1(xt+1|xt)dF (xt+1|xt)
 
+  ⇡st+1b(at+1)
)
(A.1)
The solution to the above decision problem is given by a sequence of consumption {c(xt)}Tt=1,
hours {h(xt)}Tt=1, employment {d(xt)}Tt=1and social security benefit application {b(xt)}Tt=1
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rules which solve the bellman equation (A.1). Even though there is no closed form solution
for optimal consumption, hours, employment choice and benefit application, these rules
fully characterize the decisions of the individuals.
The decision rules are computed numerically by value function iteration, starting at time
T and working backwards to the first period. Time T decision rules are found by maxi-
mizing equation (A.1) subject to the budget constraint (BC), liquidity constraint (LC) and
consumption floor (CF) for each value of the state xt and VT+1 = b(aT+1).
The state variables are discretized into a finite number of points on a grid and the value
function is evaluated at those points. More specifically I choose 30 asset states, 10 wage
states, 10 AIME states, 10 defined contribution wealth states, 2 application states, 2 health
states, 10 tenure states, 3 pension plan types, 2 states for being laid off or not and 3 states
for last period participation status. This requires solving the value function at 30 ⇥ 10 ⇥
10 ⇥ 10 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 3 = 720000 different points between ages 62 and 70 (when the
individual is eligible to apply) and 360000 points before 62 and after age 70 for both DB
and DC guys.
A.1.2 Quadrature Rules
This section provides the quadrature rules used to evaluate the uncertainty with respect to
wages and rate of return on DC account.
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Wages
wt+1 = exp(!(mt+1, aget+1)) exp(⇢w⌘t) exp(✏
w
t+1)
= exp(!(mt+1, aget+1)) exp(⇢w log(wt)  ⇢w!(mt, aget)) exp(✏wt+1)
= exp[⇢w log(wt) + (1  ⇢w)!(mt, aget)] exp[⇢w!(mt+1, aget+1)
  ⇢w!(mt, aget)] exp(✏wt+1)
= w¯t+1 exp(✏
w
t+1)
EVt+1(wt+1) =
Z
Vt+1(wt+1)f(wt+1|wt)dw
=
Z
Vt+1(w¯t+1 · exp(✏wt+1))f(exp(✏wt+1)| exp(✏wt ))d✏t+1
=
Z
Vt+1(w¯t+1 · z)f(z)dz (Where z ⇠ logNormal(0,  2✏ ))
=
1
z ✏
p
2⇡
Z
Vt+1(w¯t+1 · z)e
 (log(z))2
2 2✏ dz
Let log(z)p
2 ✏
= x =) z = exp[xp2 ✏] This change of variable gives dz = (z
p
2 ✏)dx.
Hence we get:
EVt+1(wt+1) =
1p
⇡
Z
Vt+1(w¯t+1 · exp(x
p
2 ✏))e x
2
dx (A.2)
The integral in Equation (A.2) can be approximated by Gauss Hermite Quadrature Rules:
1p
⇡
Z
Vt+1(w¯t+1 · exp(x
p
2 ✏))e x
2
dx ⇡ 1
⇡
NX
1
Vt+1(w¯t+1 exp(xi
p
2 ✏))!i
Where {xi,!i}Ni=1 are Quadrature nodes and weights respectively. More specifically, I use
quadrature of order 5 to evaluate the above integrals.
i 1 2 3 4 5
xi -2.0202 -0.9586 0.0000 0.9586 2.0202
!i 0.0200 0.3936 0.9453 0.3936 0.0200
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Defined Contribution Wealth
DC⇤t+1 = DCt+1(1 + rt+1)
= DCt+1(1 + r¯) exp(✓t+1)
EVt+1(DC
⇤
t+1) =
Z
Vt+1(DC
⇤
t+1)f(DC
⇤
t+1)dDC
⇤
=
Z
Vt+1(DCt+1(1 + r¯) exp(✓t+1))f(exp(✓t+1))d✓
=
Z
Vt+1(DCt+1(1 + r¯) · z)f(z)dz (Where z ⇠ logNormal(0,  2✓))
=
1
z ✓
p
2⇡
Z
Vt+1(DCt+1(1 + r¯) · z)e
 (log(z))2
2 2✏ dz
Let log(z)p
2 ✓
= x =) z = exp[xp2 ✓] This change of variable gives dz = (z
p
2 ✓)dx.
Hence we get:
EVt+1(DC
⇤
t+1) =
1p
⇡
Z
Vt+1(DCt+1(1 + r¯) · exp(x
p
2 ✓))e x
2
dx (A.3)
The integral in Equation (A.3) can be approximated by Gauss Hermite Quadrature Rules:
1p
⇡
Z
Vt+1(DCt+1(1 + r¯) · exp(x
p
2 ✓))e x
2
dx ⇡ 1p
⇡
NX
1
Vt+1(DCt+1(1 + r¯) exp(xi
p
2 ✓))!i
Where {xi,!i}Ni=1 are Quadrature nodes and weights respectively. More specifically, I use
quadrature of order 5 to evaluate the above integrals.
i 1 2 3 4 5
xi -2.0202 -0.9586 0.0000 0.9586 2.0202
!i 0.0200 0.3936 0.9453 0.3936 0.0200
2-D Quadrature
In the case where there is uncertainty pertaining to both DC wealth and wages, I use 2-
dimensional quadrature to evaluate the expectation. More specifically, I use product rule
based on 1-dimensional Gauss Hermite Quadrature rules for both wages and DC wealth
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[Judd, 1998].
EVt+1(wt+1, DC
⇤
t+1) ⇡
1
⇡
5X
i=1
5X
j=1
!i!jVt+1(w¯t+1 exp(xi
p
2 ✏), DCt+1(1 + r¯) exp(xj
p
2 ✓))
A.2 Parameters
The preference parameters in Table A.1 are going to be estimated in the next version of
this using the structural model described in Section (3.2). Currently these are taken from
French [2005]. Table A.2 reports the value of some other parameters fixed in the analysis:
Table A.1: Preference Parameters
Parameter and Definition Value
  discount factor 0.992
l¯ leisure endowment 4466
⇢ coefficient of relative risk aversion 3.34
⌫ consumption weight 0.578
✓beq bequest weight 1.69
 H hours of leisure lost due to bad health 318
Table A.2: Other Parameters
Parameter value
r¯ 0.04
  0.014
crw 0.06
cre 0.03
⇢W 0.013
 ✏w 0.977
c¯ 1000
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Appendix B
Supplemental Material to The Costs and
Benefits of Increased Generic
Substitution
B.1 MCMC Sampler
The set of parameters to be estimated is given by { i1, ...,  iJ 1, {⌘ij,t}Ti 1⌧=1 , ⌫¯1, ..., ⌫¯J 1,  ¯2 0 ,↵}
We use Bayesian inference to estimate this parameter vector which requires an uncondi-
tional prior distribution of the parameter vector along with the liklihood function.
Prior Distribution
We specify the following prior distribution for our parameters:
[ i| ¯,⌦ ¯] ⇠MVN( ¯,⌦ ¯)
[ ¯| ¯0, S0] ⇠MVN( ¯0, S0)
[⌦ ¯|K, I] ⇠ IW (K, I)
[↵|↵m0 ,↵v0] = N(↵m0 ,↵v0)
[⌫¯|⌫m0 , ⌫v0 ] ⇠MVN(⌫m0 , ⌫v0 )
[
1
 2 0
| m0 ,  v0 ] ⇠ N( m0 ,  v0)
[⌘ijt|µ⌘,  ⌘] ⇠ N(µ⌘,  ⌘)
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Hence joint prior distribution of our parameter vector ⇥ = { i}Ni ⇥ is given by:
k(⇥) =
NY
i=1
✓
[ i| ¯,⌦ ¯]
TiY
⌧=1
[⌘ij⌧ |µ⌘,  ⌘]
◆
⇥ [ ¯| ¯0, S0]⇥ [⌦ ¯|K, I]⇥ [↵|↵m0 ,↵v0]
⇥[⌫¯|⌫m0 , ⌫v0 ]⇥ [
1
 2 0
| m0 ,  v0 ]
Joint Posterior Distribution
Given the prior distribution of the parameter vector and the liklihood function, the joint
posterior distribution of the parameter vector conditional on the data is given by:
K(⇥|{di,Xi}Ni=) /
NY
i=1
Li(di|Xi; i, )k(⇥)
Bayesian inference requires drawing from this joint posterior distribution of the parameter
vector. While it is possible to draw directly from this distribution using the Metropolis
Hastings algorithm, it computationally very slow. Hence draws from this distribution are
obtained through Gibbs sampling. This is an iterative process which requires drawing
each parameter conditional on other parameters. Following [Train, 2009], we specify the
following Gibbs sampling procedure for drawing from the joint posterior distribution.
1. Update  i = { i1, ...,  iJ 1} using a Metropolis-Hastings sampler.
2. Update  ¯ and ⌦ ¯ using a Gibbs sampler
3. Update ↵ by a Metropolis-Hastings sampler
4. Update {⌫¯1, ..., ⌫¯J 1,  ¯2 0} using a Metropolis-Hastings sampler
5. Update {⌘ij,⌧}t 1⌧=1 by a Metropolis-Hastings sampler
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